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World-Ordering Power and
Passionate Commitment

There are two goals for this final chapter. The first is to suggest
another holistic principle by which Christian beliefs may be justi
fied, thus indirectly strengthening PT N· Although this by no
means provides a full account of holism vis-a-vis theistic belief, it
provides another small piece of the sketch of a map for further
exploration. The second goal is simply, by way of conclusion, to
summarize briefly the positions argued in this book.
I . More on Holism
All that was suggested in Chapter I I about the holistic frame
work for defending PTN dealt with confirmation understood from
within the various epistemic practices. This was an attempt to meet
the internal consistency requirement that is typically taken to be
part and parcel of holist theories. But there is much more to holist
theories of rationality than mere confirmation and consistency.
There is also a comprehensiveness requirement. A holist theory of
rationality must include a description of how much of our experi
ence is taken account of by the set of beliefs taken to be justified.
The most comprehensive system is the rational one, other things
being equal. I say nothing further about this requirement vis-a-vis
showing CP to be rationally engaged in except this brief point. To
argue that CP is the most comprehensive system of religious be-
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liefs would be to argue that the internal support of CP is not only
equal but superior to that of other religious epistemic practices. So
arguing would be doing the work required to reply more fully to
the religious plurality challenge discussed in Chapter I I .
There is also what we can call the requirement of "coherence,"
that is, the supposed internal relatedness of beliefs in a holist sys
tem. This requirement is notorious in that it is very difficult to say
just what this relatedness comes to. Is it logical entailment, or a
kind of probabilistic relation, or explanatory power, or aesthetic
harmony? There is also the requirement of congruence, that is, the
ability of the system of beliefs to deal with empirical data, or, put
otherwise, the appropriateness of the interpretive scheme to expe
rience. I say nothing in detail of either of these. But I do say some
thing about one feature of our religious belief systems that is often
overlooked or at least not dealt with to any degree by epistemolo
gists. The issue touches to some degree on each of the require
ments listed here, but what I have to say is not meant to be a fully
developed thesis about holism.
2 . Belief, A cceptance, and Commitment

As is well known, the Bible commands Christians and Jews to
love the Lord their God with all their hearts, souls, and minds.
Some act on this command. One question to ask is this. When
they do, how is the resulting firm religious commitment epi
stemically acceptable, given what many, theists and nontheists
alike, see as the limited amount of evidence for theistic claims?
Before answering this question, I need to make some preliminary
distinctions.
We can identify at least four senses of the term "belief, " labeling
them as follows: (a) proposition, (b) belief, (c) acceptance, and (d)
commitment. In the remainder of this chapter, I mean by "propo
sition" what logicians sometimes do-that which is asserted by de
clarative utterances or that which is either true or false. The re
maining three senses of "belief' stand in relation to this first sense.
A proposition is that which is believed or accepted or that to which
one is committed. Thus, belief, acceptance, and commitment are
all propositional attitudes. I took note of some of Plantinga's com
ments about these distinctions in Chapter 6, but I said little of them
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save for calling attention to them. Returning to a few of his com
ments illustrates more fully what I have in mind.
Plantinga lists what he thinks should be given in an account of a
person's noetic structure. 1 In particular, he notes that one can dis
tinguish between belief and acceptance:
Consider a Christian beset by doubts. He has a hard time believing
certain crucial Christian claims-perhaps the teaching that God was
in Christ, reconciling the world to himsel( Upon calling that belief
to mind, he finds it cold, lifeless, without warmth or attractiveness.
Nonetheless he is committed to this belief; it is his position; if you
ask him what he thinks about it, he will unhesitatingly endorse it.
He has, so to speak, thrown in his lot with it. Let us say that he
accepts this proposition, even though when he is assailed by doubt,
he may fail to believe it-at any rate explicitly-to any appreciable
degree. His commitment to this proposition may be much stronger
than his explicit and occurrent belief in it; so these two-that is,
acceptance and belief-must be distinguished. 2
Plantinga says no more about this distinction. Nevertheless, we
can extract from his example that beliefs have warmth, attractive
ness, and liveliness whereas acceptances do not. Two things should
be noted here. First, these characteristics are surely metaphorical.
What exactly they come to, when stripped of the metaphor, is dif
ficult to say. Perhaps these characteristics just are the fact that one
believes rather than (merely) accepts. Second, whatever they come
to, these characteristics surely have more to do with the psychol
ogy of the one holding the belief than they do with the proposi
tions held.
Plantinga also seems to suggest that one can doubt that p is true
and yet accept it, whereas (employing the same notion of doubt)
one cannot doubt p and yet believe p. One can accept some propo
sition, in spite of its lack of warmth, liveliness, and attractiveness.
This may simply be an extension of the point above; perhaps
doubt simply is the absence of these phenomenological features,
just as belief is their presence. We have, thus, an intuitive picture of
belief and acceptance with which to work.
r. What follows is an incomplete list of Plantinga's suggestions; see his " Rea
son and Belief in God" for further information.

2. Ibid., p. 37·
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Plantinga also includes in his requirements for an account of a
person's noetic structure both an index of degree of belief and an
index of degree of acceptance. This brings us to the last sense of
"belief, " that is, commitment. Plantinga writes: "I believe both
that 2 + 1 = 3 and London, England, is north of Saskatoon, Sas
katchewan; but I believe the former more resolutely than the lat
ter. "3 Presumably he would say something similar about the index
of degree of acceptance. At any rate, here we have what I wish to
isolate as commitment. Commitment, as I understand the term,
has to do with the relative unwillingness of the epistemic subject to
give up a proposition. The more unwilling one is to give up a
proposition as true, the more firm one's commitment to that prop
osition is. So, we hold various propositions with different levels of
firmness. This is true whether they are held as beliefs or accep
tances; one can be more or less committed to a proposition in
terms of how firmly one believes it as well as in terms of how
firmly one accepts it. In short, one can be more or less strongly
committed to a proposition; thus, there are levels of commitment.
Furthermore, it appears that commitment of these two types
(belief- and acceptance-commitment) can be at odds with one an
other. In his example, Plantinga suggests that the Christian's com
mitment to the proposition he accepts (but has a hard time believ
ing) is greater than his occurrent belief in that proposition.
Although there are many questions one could ask of Plantinga's
example, it seems clear enough that there are various levels of
commitment to propositions, and this commitment is intimately
related to belief and acceptance, even when belief and acceptance
conflict.
Now, it is certain that the demands of the Judea-Christian tradi
tion involve passionate commitment. What kinds of epistemic con
straints is such commitment under?
3.

The Justification Maxim

Let us say that one requirement of commitment is expressed by
what I call the "justification maxim. " Roughly, the justification
maxim is that no proposition should be given more (or less) com3· Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology, " p. 54·
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mitment than its (epistemic) justification can bear. More formally,
where PA is any propositional attitude,
Justification Maxim1 : The commitment allotted p by S,
via S's PA, ought to be commensurate with S's (epi
stemic) justification for p.
Note that, so described, the justification maxim is a normative
claim. Need it be? Perhaps not. Perhaps the thrust behind it could
be understood in Alston's evaluative sense. Thus, one might sug
gest that the justification maxim is better described as:
Justification Maxim2: It is a good thing, from the epi
stemic point of view, that the commitment allotted p by
S, via S's PA, is commensurate with S's (epistemic) justi
fication for p.
Whichever framework the justification maxim is best understood
in (I work with the evaluative version here, without defending it
explicitly), it suggests a certain kind of problem with theistic be
lief.
Theistic belief is often, if not typically, taken by the mature be
liever as seriously as, or more seriously than, any other belief. This
frequently means that, when other beliefs conflict with theistic be
lief, the others lose out: the competing beliefs are modified or re
jected in accordance with the demands of the theistic beliefs. This
signals the extraordinary firmness of the believer's commitment to
ward her theistic belief. The question on which I focus here is,
then, how such firm commitment is justified vis-a-vis what many
people, theist and nontheist alike, take to be the relative lack of
evidence for theistic beliefs.
My concern is not that theistic propositions lack evidence alto
gether; it seems clear enough that they do not. It is not, that is,
that theists are irrational in believing or accepting certain claims.
That, it seems to me, is the burden and the success of Reformed
epistemology. Rather, the problem is how to provide sufficient evi
dence for one's believings and acceptings in light of the very firm,
heartfelt commitment the theistic believer often has toward these
propositions. In suggesting a solution to this problem, the follow
ing discussion indicates another reason to move toward a holistic
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account of CP's epistemic status, as well as some principles with
which to begin the conversation. Conveniently enough, some of
Plantinga's claims are suggestive of a solution to the problem of
theistic commitment. Thus, I once again engage Plantinga's claims
directly, but that is not my primary aim. His work is simply a
good place to begin. I briefly review Plantinga's criticism of classi
cal foundationalism and then move on to a challenge to his posi
tion. I suggest a response and then use that response as a spring
board for further discussion.
4 . Plantinga's Criticism of Classical

Foundationalism Revisited
Plantinga's response to the evidentialist challenge, insofar as it is
rooted in classical foundationalism (see Chapter 6), is twofold. The
first claim is that the classical account of the criterion for a beliefs
being properly basic is self-referentially incoherent. The second as
pect of Plantinga's challenge is that the history of skepticism
teaches us that, rather than being a steady rock on which to rest
knowledge and rational belief, classical foundationalism has been
the rock on which knowledge and rational belief founder. Accord
ing to the skeptical tradition, classical foundationalism's criterion
does not allow many of our ordinary beliefs to be justified. That
Susan is in pain, or that there is a tree in front of us, are claims that
are not properly basic according to the classical criterion for proper
basicality (a belief is properly basic if and only if it is either self
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses) . Yet we have no
argument for these beliefs or their kind; we can give no discursive
account of them vis-a-vis the requirements of classical founda
tionalism. They are thus not properly nonbasic either, and skepti
cism is at the door. How can classical foundationalism remain a
viable theory when many of our widespread beliefs cannot be justi
fied in light of its demands? For Plantinga it is not viable and ought
to be rejected.
If classical foundationalism is not viable, then neither is eviden
tialism insofar as it grows out of classical foundationalism. Thus,
the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief is not viable either. As
we have seen, however, Plantinga has opened the door to another
theory of rationality that does not, he thinks, rule out the proper
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basicality of either our widespread beliefs or the religious believer's
theistic beliefs.
Since the classical criterion for proper basicality has been rejected
as too narrow, whatever replacement is suggested should be broad
enough to allow our widespread beliefs to be rational. In particu
lar, Plantinga mentions beliefs about other minds, beliefs about the
external world, and beliefs about the past. I do not think Plantinga
would be against adding to this list beliefs about how we discover
things about the world, specifically the principles of induction, de
duction, the scientific method, and the like. But I see no easy way
to capture such principles. Let us just say that those principles we
typically use to advance our knowledge ought not to be ruled out
by the replacement criterion.
With these restrictions on what we can take as an acceptable cri
terion, recall Plantinga's suggestion that we should use an induc
tive procedure to discover a criterion for proper basicality. Can this
approach be successful in producing the results Plantinga desires,
namely, allowing for the proper basicality of beliefs about God but
ruling out a too-narrow criterion? Why, for example, can the clas
sical foundationalist not argue that, since Plantinga's suggested
procedure is person- or community-relative, it may be possible to
find a group of classical foundationalists who hold the traditional
classical criterion for proper basicality and who find it to be self
evident? This is possible on Plantinga's own grounds, they might
say, for Plantinga suggests that self-evidence is a person-relative
notion.4
Suppose, then, that the classical foundationalists do some field
work, finding a group of epistemologists who have done Plan
tinga's suggested inductive procedure. Furthermore, suppose this
group finds the classical criterion to be self-evident. For these epis
temologists (call them the "entrenched classical foundationalists"),
since the classical criterion is self-evident, the self-referential criti
cism fails.
4· See Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Rational?" in Rationality and Religious Belief,
ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1979),
where Plantinga discusses self-evidence at length. In a delightfully humorous
story, George Mavrodes, "The Stranger, " in Faith and Rationality, ed. Plantinga
and W olterstorff, pokes fun at the notion of self-evidence as described by Plan
tinga. In the story, a proof for God's existence begins with the self-evident premise
that Jesus Christ rose from the dead.
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Plantinga can retort as follows. First, by suggesting that self
evidence is person-relative, he never meant that just anything can
be taken to be self-evident. Generally, self-evident propositions are
person-relative only in the sense that, as one's knowledge of a field
grows, one's grasp of the truths in that field becomes deeper. For
example, some mathematical proposition that was self-evident for
Einstein is not for me. It might become self-evident for me if I
study enough mathematics, but it is not right now. Nevertheless,
it is unlikely that one's knowledge of epistemology will ever help
one come to grasp self-evidently a proposition as controversial as
the classical criterion. Unlike some mathematical propositions,
even if the classical criterion is explained to me I will never self
evidently "see" it. On this basis Plantinga might ask the entrenched
classical foundationalists if they . really find the classical criterion
self-evident or if they are only stretching to reach something that
protects their favorite theory.
Second, and more important, Plantinga can fall back on the
widespread belief criticism. Even if the classical criterion truly does
seem self-evident to entrenched classical foundationalists, accord
ing to classical foundationalism all one's beliefs must be justified.
This demand extends to principles by which we come to know
things. In addition to the classical criterion, there are the principles
of induction, for example. Yet the classical criterion seems to rule
out their legitimate use, since they are not self-evident, incorrig
ible, or evident to the senses. Nor do they follow from beliefs that
are. This problem has been a skeptical thorn in the classical founda
tionalist's flesh since Hume at least.
The entrenched classical foundationalists might suggest that in
ductive principles are themselves self-evident, but this move seems
to open the foundations to just about anything being self-evident.
Such a move would play into Plantinga's hands, for if that is what
one means by self-evidence, why not take theistic beliefs to be self
evident (and thus properly basic) as well? As an alternative, the
entrenched classical foundationalists may suggest that inductive
principles ought to be understood as part of a heuristic meta
epistemological framework. By definition, however, this move is
ruled out. Foundationalism requires that all rational beliefs be ei
ther properly basic or nonbasic. Belief in the principles of induc
tion cannot be outside one's noetic structure. How then are induc
tive principles to be j ustified?
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Plantinga's modified foundationalism fares better in answering
this question. Caution is needed, however, for if there is one thing
to be learned from the widespread belief criticism it is this: the
criteria for properly basic beliefs cannot be overly strong. But it is
simple enough to desire overly strong criteria. Plantinga seems to
do this himself in his response to the Great Pumpkin objection,
where he writes:
If belief in God is properly basic, why can't just any belief be prop
erly basic? Couldn't we say the same about any bizarre aberration
we can think of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the
belief that the Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I
properly take that as basic? . . . If we say that belief in God is prop
erly basic, won't we be committed to holding that just anything, or
nearly anything, can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide
the gates to irrationalism and superstition?5

In his response, Plantinga makes it clear that not just any belief
can be properly basic but that a properly basic belief, although
lacking discursive evidence, does not lack grounding. Thus, some
beliefs are not properly basic for they lack grounding. Further,
Plantinga claims that arriving at the criterion for proper basicality
leads to charging belief in the Great Pumpkin with irrationality.
But why should the Great Pumpkinite accept this? Admittedly,
belief in the Great Pumpkin is not something I take to be rational,
but what if we come on some tribe that believes it is? Suppose this
tribe has read Plantinga, followed his inductive procedure, and
takes Great Pumpkin belief as properly basic? Suppose they even
specify their criterion for proper basicality and it does not lead to
incoherence? What is Plantinga to say?
Perhaps Plantinga's desire to rule out Great Pumpkin belief is
motivated by the fact that we do not have any natural inclination
to believe in the Great Pumpkin whereas we do have a natural
inclination to believe in God. Nevertheless, Plantinga qua theist
would surely admit the rationality of Great Pumpkin belief insofar
as such belief actually resembles theistic belief. But is this not just
to say that the force of Plantinga's response is derived from the
oddity of the example he chooses? Had he chosen Judaism, Islam,
s. Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," p. 5 8 .
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or Hinduism perhaps the rejection of the objection would not seem
to follow quite so quickly.
How would it be possible, once the inductive procedure is com
pleted, for Great Pumpkin belief to be rejected as irrational? First,
if no one ever had Great Pumpkin experiences and simply chose
arbitrarily to believe in the Great Pumpkin, no such belief would
be rational. It would not be grounded. Second, if one did have
Great Pumpkin experiences to ground such belief and Plantinga
still rejected the belief as irrational, he must mean that no Great
Pumpkinite's belief is rational. He must, in other words, have
some independent reason for rejecting Great Pumpkin belief,
namely, it fails to meet Plantinga's criterion. He must hold that the
criteria for proper basicality are quite strong-so strong as not to
be person- or community-relative. Plantinga seems to think this
way, at least part of the time; if one inductively arrives at P as the
criterion for proper basicality and P rules out Great Pumpkin be
lief, then no one's belief in the Great Pumpkin could be rational.
But, with respect to Plantinga, what if the Great Pumpkinite takes
his belief to be properly basic and thus arrives at a different crite
rion? Plantinga's response is inconsistent with his inductive pro
cedure and its potential results. To be consistent, he must allow for
such a potentiality. The Great Pumpkin objection, understood as
the demand for a very liberal openness to what might count as
properly basic, seems to stand against his theory, and thus Plan
tinga appears to be committed to a weaker sense of rationality than
some of his comments indicate.
Since Plantinga himself struggles with the status of the criterion
for proper basicality, one wonders about the proper way to under
stand it. We can say at least two things. First, any criterion must
itself be rationally justified. Second, inductive procedures can jus
tify some criteria. This latter point entails that the proposition ex
pressing a criterion is non basic, since the proposition (or rather its
belief or acceptance) is based on others. The principles of induc
tion, on the other hand, can be either basic or nonbasic. Either
way, the criterion must not be overly strong or the grounding of
the principles of induction becomes impossible. If the principles are
to be properly basic, the criterion cannot rule them out. If they are
to be nonbasic, there must be some properly basic belief (or set of
beliefs) to justify the principles of induction which is not itself
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ruled out by the criterion. For our purposes, given a sufficiently
weak criterion, the principles of induction can be properly basic.
The following sketch shows how.
Suppose we set out to discover which of our beliefs are properly
basic. We decide that, if anything is properly basic, beliefs A, B, C,
and the principles of induction are. Of course, at this time we do
not know the criterion for proper basicality. Intuitively, however,
we take these beliefs as basic and properly so. We discover induc
tively that these beliefs all share property P. Property P is thus the
criterion for proper basicality. The statement that expresses the fact
that P is the criterion for proper basicality can be based on at least
one other belief, specifically, one of the principles of induction.
Thus, the statement of the criterion is nonbasic, yet P functions as
a criterion for A, B, C, and the principles of induction. Induction
thus legitimately justifies P as the criterion. The principles of in
duction, however, need not be discursively justified but are
grounded, since they fall under the criterion discovered by the in
ductive approach. So, Plantinga's modified foundationalism can
fare well, potentially at least, on the issue of how inductive princi
ples are to be justified.
5.

Widespread Beliefs as Fundamental Assumptions
of Rationality

The above suggestions leave open the possibility of accounting
for our widespread belief in the principles of induction. In fact, on
the account sketched above these principles are important in dis
covering the replacement for the classical criterion for proper ba
sicality and yet do not lead to the kind of self-referential incoher
ence found in classical foundationalism. But what about other
widespread beliefs such as beliefs about other persons, the external
world, or the past? Do these fare as well? I believe they do, but I
do not take the time here to consider them individually. Instead, I
consider why these so-called widespread beliefs are important to
rationality.
It would be a mistake to think that the importance of these
widespread beliefs for rationality lies in the fact that most everyone
takes them to be true. First of all, it clearly does not follow from
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the fact that most people hold (versions of) the widespread beliefs
that the beliefs are indeed true. This is a variation of that infamous
freshman fallacy of the bandwagon. But even if they were all true,
their truth does not necessarily make them rational. What does?
Consider these propositions. "There are other people alive. "
"There are real trees (or rocks, or mountains, or the like) . " "I
remember yesterday's events accurately. " Such propositions,
whether held as beliefs or acceptances, are central in our lives. One
cannot imagine, at least with any seriousness, living life without
them (or at least their near relatives). Why do we take them so
seriously? Why do we take them as a necessary starting point for
any theory of rationality? Simply stated, I believe they have the
ability to greatly arrange and order our other beliefs and accep
tances.
There appears to be a hierarchy of beliefs and acceptances in our
noetic structures. Some we are willing to give up quite quickly;
others we are not. What I have been calling widespread beliefs fall
into the latter category. Another notion from Plantinga's work can
help us explore the importance of this observation. He claims that
in describing one's noetic structure one must include an index of
"depth of ingression":
Some of my beliefs are, we might say, on the periphery of my no
etic structure. I accept them, and may even accept them quite
firmly, but if I were to give them up, not much else in my noetic
structure would have to change. I believe there are some large boul
ders on the top of the Grand Teton. If l come to give up this belief,
however, . . . that change wouldn't have extensive reverberations
throughout the rest of my noetic structure; it could be accommo
dated with minimal alteration elsewhere. So its depth of ingression
into my noetic structure isn't great. On the other hand, if I were to
come to believe that there simply is no such thing as the Grand
Teton, or no such thing as the State of Wyoming, that would have
much greater reverberations. And if, per impossible, I were to come
to think there hadn' t been much of a past . . . or that there weren't
any other persons, that would have even greater reverberations;
these beliefs of mine have great depth of ingression into my noetic
structure. 6
6. Ibid. , p. 55·

Rationality and Theistic Belief
To give up some beliefs would radically alter one's noetic struc
ture. The connections between beliefs can be enormous in number
and complicated in kind. I suggest that the reason the so-called
widespread beliefs are so important to rationality is that they have,
to borrow Plantinga's phrase, the greatest depth of ingression. Per
haps more intuitive terminology would be helpful here. Let us say
that such beliefs have the greatest world-ordering power.
Before moving on, it is important to clarify exactly which beliefs
or acceptances have the status of being widespread, as well as the
relationships between the notion of world-ordering power and no
tions such as level of commitment, belief, and acceptance. Obvi
ously we cannot simply identify widespread beliefs as person-spe
cific beliefs. For example,
(1) I am writing at a brown desk

is not widespread. Since you are reading, rather than writing, (1) is
not one of your current beliefs. Neither, in all likelihood, is (1) a
belief many people have right now.
It is also not the case that
(2) There is an external world

is widely held in the sense that most people now believe it. Many
nonphilosophers have not even thought about it, let alone believe
it. In fact, it is not belief qua propositional attitude that is impor
tant at all. Instead we should consider beliefs qua propositions.
But it is not idiosyncratic propositions that are truly central ei
ther. Rather, it is the kind of proposition that is important. Here
the kind is picked out by the various contents of beliefs; there are
beliefs about physical objects, others about other persons, still
others about the past, and so forth. It is certain kinds of proposi
tion that are widely held, rather than any idiosyncratic proposition.
Everyone holds these kinds of proposition: physical object proposi
tions, other-mind propositions, and so forth. And although we are
willing to admit that we can be wrong about some individual
members of the various kinds, we are not typically willing to ad
mit that we can be wrong about the entire kind.
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So the terminology "widespread belief'' is misleading in two
ways. What is important for our discussion is not beliefs qua prop
ositional attitude. Nor is it belief qua idiosyncratic proposition.
What is important is rather that certain assumptions are made by
every person with ordinary beliefs. It is here, I believe, that the
distinction between beliefs and acceptances becomes important. As
noted, most people do not explicitly believe propositions such as
"There is an external world, " or "There are other minds, " and the
like. I have little doubt, however, that on inquiry most people
would admit that they at least accept such propositions as back
ground assumptions. These propositions are immediately entailed
by the ordinary kinds of propositions we all hold. Even though
many, if not most, people do not explicitly believe them (not ever
having really thought about them), they do believe propositions
that fall into the kinds "external world propositions," "other-mind
propositions, " and so forth. Our acceptance/assumption of propo
sitions such as "There is an external world" and "There are other
minds" simply expresses our commitment to our ordinary beliefs
being (generally) rational.
These acceptances are greatly world-ordering. They are parts of
the complex of speech and action that go into making up our
shared lives together. One cannot successfully ignore or question
these acceptances; questioning comes to an end. These acceptances
are so deeply embedded in our noetic structures and our human
culture that we simply cannot shake them off. Since we must start
somewhere in giving an account of rationality, we might just as
well begin with the paradigm cases that seem to be necessary for
human communication and culture. These acceptances, in a way,
are what make us rational.
If I am right about this, then the concerns of Plantinga' s "wide
spread belief criticism" turn out to be concerns about giving an
account of certain acceptances that all rational persons have. We all
accept certain propositions about reality. Any theory of rationality
that fails to explain them is to be rejected on the grounds that it
overlooks fundamental constituents of rationality. In light of all
this, let what I have been calling widespread beliefs now be re
ferred to as "fundamental assumptions of rationality. "

2 44 ]

Rationality and Theistic Belief

6. World-Ordering Power and Fundamental
Assumptions of Rationality
I turn now to give an account of how fundamental assumptions
of rationality are related to commitment and world-ordering
power. First we need a more formal account of world-ordering
power:
World-Ordering Power: The ability of a (change in) belief
in, or acceptance of, a (given) proposition to adjust other
beliefs or acceptances in S's noetic structure.
All beliefs and acceptances have the power to make us adjust our
noetic structures. When we take on a new belief, we make other
changes as well. When we lose an acceptance, we make other ad
justments to go with the loss. What I wish to propose for consid
eration is that world-ordering power is connected to a principle of
rationality, namely, the justification maxim suggested earlier.
The justification maxim demands that no proposition be held
with greater commitment than that permitted by its justification.
Taking commitment to be the level of (un)willingness to give up
one's propositional attitude toward a proposition, one must find
some principle that connects one's commitment with one's justi
fication for the proposition. One possibility for linking commit
ment to epistemic justification is to make commitment a function
of world-ordering power. Let us call this the "principle of commit
ment. "
Principle of Commitment: It is a good thing, from the
epistemic point of view, if S's (belief or acceptance) com
mitment to a proposition p is commensurate with the
world-ordering power of p for S. 7
Accordingly, the more world-ordering power a belief or accep
tance has, the more epistemic justification it has. Thus the beliefs
7. There is also a normative account of the principle of commitment: S's (belief
or acceptance) commitment to a proposition p ought to be commensurate with the
world-ordering power of p for S. Again, the version one picks depends on other
considerations. Just as I elected to work with the evaluative version of the j ustifica
tion maxim, so I elect to work with the evaluative version of the principle of
commitment.
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or acceptances having the least world-ordering power are those to
which the least commitment accrues, and those having the greatest
world-ordering power are those with the greatest commitment, at
least in a rational noetic framework. 8 This raises the obvious ques
tion, what does the world-ordering power of a belief or acceptance
have to do with its epistemic justification?
A variety of answers could be given here. I limit my discussion
to two, rejecting the first. Return to the sketch in Section 4 where
Plantinga's inductive procedure was used to discover a criterion for
proper basicality while allowing the widespread belief in induction
to be rational. There it was suggested that some property P is
shared by all the beliefs we intuitively take to be properly basic.
Thus P is the criterion for proper basicality. My initial answer link
ing world-ordering power to justification is simply that P may be
the world-ordering power of the properly basic beliefs in question:
A, B, C, and the principles of induction all share the same level of
world-ordering power. What level? It seems that it would have to
be the greatest level of world-ordering power for S, for, according
to foundationalism, properly basic beliefs are to play a special role
in one's noetic structure.
Traditionally, foundationalists thought that one's properly basic
beliefs were beliefs without epistemic fault; in particular, they were
thought to carry a guarantee of truth. More recent versions of
foundationalism have given up the high goal of truth guarantee.
Nevertheless, the assumption that basic beliefs play a special role
remains. Plantinga, for example, writes: "From the foundationalist
point of view not just any kind of belief can be found in the foun
dations of a rational noetic structure; a belief to be properly basic
(that is, basic in a rational noetic structure) must meet certain con
ditions. It must be capable of functioning foundationally, capable
of bearing its share of the weight of the whole noetic structure. "9
What is it for a belief to be capable of functioning founda
tionally, to be able to bear its share of the weight? Well, on the
classical model of foundationalism, it was to be self-evident, incor
rigible, or evident to the senses. But, as we have seen, these sug8. This is contrary to the above quotation from Plantinga in which he indicates
that a belief can be firmly held but be on the periphery of one's noetic structure
(not greatly world-ordering).
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God, " p. 55.
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gestions are problematic vis-a-vis the demands of classical founda
tionalism itself, as well as in giving an account of the fundamental
assumptions of rationality.
One suggestion is that to be foundational, and properly so, is to
have the greatest level of world-ordering power. One can see right
away, however, that this suggestion is problematic. One of the
most ob�ious difficulties is that beliefs such as "Susan is in pain"
and ''There is a tree over there" (examples of beliefs that are obvi
ously properly basic in the right conditions) do not have the great
est level of world-ordering power. One can give up one of these
idiosyncratic propositions without making much change in one's
noetic structure at all. Perhaps one is hallucinating, or perhaps
Susan is feigning pain for sympathy.
Recall that the propositions I identified earlier as being of the
most significance were not idiosyncratic propositions but rather the
fundamental assumptions of rationality. On the account given to
this point, only the fundamental assumptions of rationality turn
out to have the greatest world-ordering power, whereas other
cases of properly basic beliefs (such as "Susan is in pain") do not. It
seems clear enough, then, that aligning world-ordering power
with the criterion for proper basicality as a means to accounting for
commitment will not do.
Since the fundamental assumptions of rationality are the propo
sitions that have the greatest world-ordering power, it is important
to provide a theory of rational noetic structures that takes this into
account. My second answer linking world-ordering power to justi
fication is that the world-ordering power of a proposition within a
noetic structure is one of a number of coherence relations that hold
among one's beliefs and acceptances. With this suggestion we leave
a foundationalist account of rational noetic structures and move,
once again, to holism.
It has been said that foundationalism is the most attractive posi
tion vis-a-vis epistemic considerations for the theist. One reason
for this suggestion is the supposedly strong justification for prop
erly basic beliefs. When a basic belief is grounded, according to
foundationalism, there is a tie to the independently existing world;
the belief is justified independently of the system of beliefs. This
independent tie is often associated with a realist understanding,
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both in metaphysics and epistemology, a view attractive to theists
who typically believe that God created the world and that the
world therefore exists independently of human thought about it.
But if God is who the theist thinks he is, why could one not know
about God in the independent way foundationalism suggests? Thus
the attractiveness of foundationalism for theists.
With holism, however, one has no tie (or at least less of one) to
the independent world. Holist models of epistemic justification
tend to give little or minimal justification for a given belief.
Rather, a belief is only justified within a given noetic structure. In
fact, it is the structure that is justified rather than individual propo
sitions. The system relativity of holism and the lack of (or weak
ened) tie to the supposedly independently existing world are two
reasons for the theist to balk at holism.
Nevertheless, realism in metaphysics may have little to do with
epistemology. Some things may be real, and independently so, and
yet our access to them be limited. We may be, as finite humans,
trapped within our systems of beliefs. They may not reflect reality.
But if to give a holist account is the best we can do, so be it. Being
a theist does not clearly, or even naturally, lead to being a founda
tionalist.
Furthermore, I believe the present discussion gives some reason
to move to holism. Foundationalism, even Plantinga's relatively
weak version, does not provide much potential for providing an
account of passionate commitment or, for that matter, levels of
commitment that match our experience of how religious people act
vis-a-vis their religious beliefs. The account of the criterion for
proper basicality Plantinga provides may give us nondiscursive jus
tification for single, individual beliefs such as "I see a tree," but it
does little to account for the fundamental assumptions of ratio
nality. What is really important are not Plantinga's widespread be
liefs understood as individual beliefs but the fundamental assump
tions of rationality underlying them. These propositions, and our
attitudes toward them, are what are truly central for rationality. A
holist account of rationality that provides a means of accounting
for levels of commitment must include some principle of ratio
nality connecting commitment to something like world-ordering
power.
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The Justification Maxim and Theistic Belief

I have suggested that the justification maxim demands commit
ment commensurate with epistemic justification and that one po
tential principle that might provide a link between the two is the
principle of commitment. By way of conclusion, I wish to make
some observations about religious belief and its world-ordering
power.
I have said that the fundamental assumptions of rationality are
not in the typical case beliefs, but rather that they are closer to
acceptances. Most people do not explicitly believe that there is an
external world, or that there are other minds, and so forth. They
simply accept (often unconsciously) such propositions; the propo
sitions are fundamental assumptions of rationality. Nevertheless,
the commitment people have toward these propositions is great
indeed, a fact illustrated by the difficulties teachers of philosophy
have in convincing their students that the problem of the external
world is a real problem. Such assumptions are deeply embedded.
If this is true, then it may appear that my suggestions do not
apply to religion, or at least not to Christianity, and that the central
goal I set for this chapter-explaining how a theist can be firmly
and passionately committed to her beliefs in the face of what ap
pears to be insufficient evidence-are not met. Theism, after all,
involves beliefs. Christianity in particular calls for belief. One is to
"believe on the Lord Jesus Christ" to be saved. But if belief is
fundamental to theism, and yet the fundamental assumptions of
rationality qua acceptances have the greatest world-ordering
power, then how is it that radical, heartfelt theistic commitment
can be justified vis-a-vis the justification maxim and the argument
of the previous several sections?
This question can be more easily handled if broken down into
two questions. First, does religion involve fundamental assump
tions of rationality? The theist, and in particular the Christian the
ist, responds from within his or her system of belief. The answer,
given the truth of Christianity, is that yes, theistic beliefs and ac
ceptances are part and parcel of what it is to be rational. What
rational person would refuse the call and demands of God, the
Creator, in his or her life? The Christian may not be so bold as to
suggest that someone is irrational in not being a Christian, but it
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seems quite consistent to say that one is not fully rational if one
lacks Christian faith.
The second question is this. The fundamental assumptions of
rationality are closer to acceptances than they (typically) are to be
liefs. But theistic faith involves belief, not mere acceptance. How
can theistic belief then involve the great level of world-ordering
power that the other fundamental assumptions of rationality do,
but in particular those involving other human persons? A complete
answer to this question would take another long essay. Perhaps the
following suffices.
It is often noted that the nature of theistic belief is far more com
plicated than our more ordinary beliefs in propositions. Theistic
belief is much closer to trusting one's spouse or best friend than it
is merely to believing that there is a tree in the front yard. But
theistic faith is complicated in another way as well. It functions, at
least for the mature believer, as a grid through which other com
petitors for belief and acceptance are sifted. 10 I think these two
points are intimately connected. The following analogy aims our
thinking in the right direction.
I believe in my wife, much in the same way as I believe in God. I
love her, I react to her wants and de-sires, I listen to her, and so
forth. I do likewise with God. I love him, I move on (what I take
to be) his wants and desires, I listen to him, and so forth. But with
my wife I also evaluate my actions and thoughts through her con
cerns. This is not always conscious. Neither is it always done with
passionate belief There are things, for example, that I simply accept
about my wife, and that I do not necessarily believe, at least occur
rently. I accept that she will act in certain ways toward me, I accept
that her character will be more or less consistent over a period of
time, and so forth.
It seems to me that I have not always accepted these things.
Before my having come to accept them, I believed them. It was
much more important for me, in the relative immaturity of our
early relationship, to have these things before my mind's eye as
things to which I was attracted, as things that I found warm. But it
was when I moved from explicitly believing these things to acceptI O . Nicholas Wolterstorff develops this theme in some detail in Reason within the
Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans, 1976).
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ing them that the beginnings of real maturity in my marriage be
came possible. It was by my very acceptance of them that I began
to recognize my deep commitment to them and, by extension, to
her. This is not to say that I never have the propositional attitude
of belief toward these things. It is only to say that often I do not
and that the lack of belief does not adversely affect the good rela
tionship I have with my wife and, in fact, sometimes allows for an
increase in the maturity of the relationship.
Likewise with belief in God. The mature believer accepts certain
things about God, his nature, his character, and so forth. He or she
need not believe them in the explicit, conscious sense to which I
have made reference. This is why in Plantinga's example of the
doubting Christian the doubter has not lost his faith. He accepts
the problematic proposition; he has thrown in his lot with it. Thus
there are several important parallels between theistic belief and be
liefs about other individual human persons, that is, between CP
and unique person practice.
Be that as it may, there is an aspect of acceptance that was over
looked in the earlier description of the distinctions between belief
and acceptance. Some might think of acceptance as a less important
propositional attitude than belief. This, I suggest, is not the case, at
least not for all acceptances. That there is a material world, that
there are other persons, that we have some principles by which
knowledge can advance, are acceptances of which we are largely
not conscious; our propositional attitude toward them is not as ex
plicit as belief is. Yet we do not treat them lightly when they are
challenged. The religious believer in Plantinga's example still ac
cepts, although doubts, that God was in Christ reconciling the
world to himself. Belief may come and go; it waxes and wanes
with the times. But acceptance is something we do more out of a
sense of necessity-the necessity of making sense of our experience
of reality.
Religious faith does involve acceptances, and thus propositions
involved in such faith can be members of the fundamental assump
tions of rationality. As such, deep commitment given to theistic
propositions is justified, at least potentially, by the great level of
world-ordering power the propositions have for theists.
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8.

Summary and Conclusion

My objective in this book has been to explain, evaluate, and
defend what I have called the parity thesis. I conclude with a brief
summary of the points argued. First I explained and criticized PTA•
PTAs• and PT t The first and last of these founder on Alston's
failure to take into account a special role for background beliefs in
the generation and justification of Christian beliefs. PTAS• on the
other hand, fails to be true since it does not take into account the
special place for induction in the justifying argument for PP. Plan
tinga's basic parity thesis is PT PI, but the more narrow thesis, PT� ,
is the focus of my discussion, since showing the latter to be false
shows the former to be false. PT� is criticized by what I have
called the universality challenge. In defending Plantinga against
this challenge, I argued that Plantinga is committed to a kind of
arbitrariness because of, once again, a special role for background
beliefs in the generation and justification of theistic beliefs. I then
argued that Alston and Plantinga are more or less in the same epi
stemic boat vis-a-vis background beliefs.
In the course of these analyses, I introduced a distinction be
tween conceptual-reading and noninferential mediated practices.
The latter require, according to the position taken here, back
ground beliefs that need themselves to have justification. Thus I
introduced the notion of a holist aspect to the justification for both
unique person practice and CP, since both are noninferential medi
ated practices. In the process, I introduced a new parity thesis. Fi
nally, I developed the notion of comportment/nonpredictive con
firmation as one aspect of the holism, and, in response to what I
have called the problem of commitment I suggested a holist princi
ple connecting world-ordering power to epistemic commitment.
My initial goals were three. The first of these was to contribute
to the ongoing discussion of the rationality of belief in God. I hope
to have at least clarified some of the issues surrounding the parity
thesis and Reformed epistemology. The second was to provide an
account and analysis of various versions of the parity thesis. I have
considered several such accounts and found them all wanting,
more or less for the same reason-the role for background beliefs
in the justification of religious beliefs. The third and final was to
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introduce a new parity thesis that does not fall prey to the difficulty
of the others. I have sketched some of the parallels between CP
and unique person practice and attempted to argue that PTN does
�
not fall prey to the background belief challenge. To defend PTN
fully would require a complete and general account of holist epi
stemic justification. I cannot embark on that discussion here. Per
haps, however, we have now before us a few places from which to
launch the raft.
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